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Recent decades have witnessed two contradictions in global mobility. Hypermobile flows of 
capital and goods cascading around the globe, facilitated by an increasingly hegemonic 
neoliberal economic model and an accompanying web of trade agreements, are concurrent 
with increasingly restricted mobility of persons – at least those emergent from the global South 
(Bauman 1998). The construction through law, technology, fortification and intensified policing 
of the ‘wall around the West’ (Andreas & Snyder 2000) has resulted in a massive production of 
‘illegal aliens’ in the global North (Fassin 2011, p. 214). As the potential pathways for those 
seeking to escape economic deprivation or political and social persecution in the global South 
have been progressively barricaded, so too have such movements been progressively 
criminalized. The fabrication of the ‘wall around the West’ has witnessed the emergence of a 
substantial border control apparatus, often technologically mediated and buttressed by punitive 
legal developments, that is itself criminogenic and instrumental in the construction of ‘deviant’ 
migrant identities. Border control has also been loosened from its moorings, no longer a 
distinct geographical line but deterritorialized (Walters 2006) so that now it is possible to speak 
of ‘ubiquitous borders’ (Wilson & Weber 2008) that may be enacted before, at and after the 
physical borderline at a variety of switch points and by a multiplicity of agents.  
The exclusion and construction of deviant migrant identities is intertwined with two other 
notable developments. One is the weakening of the nation-state form, and there is a significant 
scholarship which interprets intensifying border control and practices of exclusion in terms of 
‘performances’ of sovereignty. This is an argument that suggests that under conditions of 
neoliberal globalization, states with diminished control of economic and social questions within 
their boundaries increasingly turn to border security and migration control as key 
‘performances’ asserting their continued relevance and strength (Wilson and Weber 2008; 
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Wilson 2006). Paradoxically, as Wendy Brown has suggested, border militarization and the 
building of walls more accurately represents ‘the waning relevance and cohesiveness’ (2010, p. 
24) of the nation-state under globalization. Linked also to the social dislocation and anxiety that 
attends neoliberal globalization, has been the emergence of virulent forms of what Balibar 
(1991) termed ‘racism without races’—hostilities directed particularly at post-colonial migrants, 
their supposed cultural incompatibility with the host society and their potential ties to ‘deviant’ 
states and nationalizing projects in their homelands (Silverstein 2005; Appadurai 2006).  As 
anthropologist Michel Agier argues, ‘at the dawn of the twenty-first century, xenophobic and 
identitarian attitudes are developing more or less everywhere, and form a public pressure that 
tends to restrict the right of asylum and promote the building of walls and camps’ (2011, p. 34).  
If the marginalization, criminalization and stigmatization of irregular migrants is fashioned at 
the macro-level by transformations of the nation-state, sovereignty and identity, it also propelled 
at another level by hostile social representations, media and political discourse (Huysmans 
2006) and by the occupational cultures of security professionals (Bigo 2002). This chapter will 
examine how migrant ‘deviance’ is constructed at the global and local level through processes 
of control manifested through law and policing. Commencing at the global level, the discussion 
will then move to consider the constitutive role of national and local border control agents in 
processes of exclusion and criminalization. The chapter will then consider the individual 
experiences of such control, and how such intensified controls both fabricate and escalate 
deviance. The discussion then moves to consider the intensified incarceration and deportation 
of irregular migrants, and how the stigma and criminalization of the deportation experience 
lingers upon individual identities following their forced return to the global South.  
Deviant States and Global Migration Policing 
Since the attacks of September 11 authorities have increasingly redefined irregular migratory 
flows as a problem of security. Such a redefinition has endeavored to position mobility ‘above 
the realm of normal politics’ (Loader 2002: 137) where considerations of social justice are 
evaded and questions of ‘effectiveness’ emerge as paramount (Loader 2002). Importantly, 
within this securitization paradigm, irregular border crossings become fused within a ‘security 
continuum’ whereby the act of migration itself becomes criminalized, and where organized 
transnational crime and terrorist threats are seamlessly congealed with irregular migration 
(Huysmans 2006). A consequence of this has been the emergence of a series of highly 
militarized and extensive border control assemblages that extends into the global South and 
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intensively polices the entrance points to the North. The practices of exclusion enacted through 
these assemblages perform multifaceted symbolic tasks of ascribing deviant and criminalized 
identities to individual border crossers, projecting sovereign power and defining the boundaries 
of citizenship through exclusion. On a material level these border control practices are 
frequently brutal and sometimes fatal, and moreover can themselves have the unintended 
consequence of escalating and stimulating deviant enterprise and entrepreneurship.  
On a global level, mobility is governed by the international visa regime, with ease of transit 
reflecting designations of ‘risk’. The European Union provides a salient example, with a list of 
‘black-listed’ nationalities designated as potential security risks for varying reasons including risk 
of illegal migration, political violence or criminality. Moreover, FRONTEX, the European 
Border Control Agency, produces its own ‘Top Ten Nationalities’ list of those assessed to pose 
the most risk. As such, Aas notes that is rooted in the assumption that ‘untrustworthy states 
produce untrustworthy identities’ (2013, p. 30). In addition states of the global North have 
increasingly acted to immobilize ‘risky’ migratory flows before their physical borders. The 
United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA), for example, maintains an extensive Risk and 
Liaison Officers Network (RALON) posted in international locations, who, within their remit, 
aim to ‘filter out high risk or undocumented individuals before they appear’ (Cabinet Office 
2007, p. 21). Through a web of bilateral and regional agreements, the global North also exports 
border control hardware, software and practices to the global South to responsibilise ‘risky 
states’ with the border work of the global North, and neutralise potentially menacing 
transnational flows at the (perceived) source. The construction of the anticipatory ‘pre-border’ 
also deputizes a whole new raft of actors into the service of security assemblages. Sending and 
transit countries, airline staff, travel agents and freight carriers, are all inducted to perform 
‘remote control’ border policing tasks before the border (Guiraudon 2003). 
As well as the construction of ‘pre-borders’ that aim to stem undesired migratory flows before 
they appear, there has also been an intensive militarization of borders, especially evident at the 
US-Mexico border and the Mediterranean edges of the European Union. With advanced 
surveillance technology, drones, military and naval patrols, razor wire, watchtowers and armed 
guards the border is increasingly configured as a war zone (Wilson 2015). The militarized 
border control of the global North pushes further out into the ‘pre-border’ through a range of 
digital and material techniques – advanced passenger processing, third country agreements, 
security collaborations and exports of technology and expertise. The consequences of this 
thickening and militarizing of the border are manifold. Both academics and activists have 
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drawn attention to the escalating body count along militarized border zones as border control 
agents mobilize their high-technology armoury to block transit routes (Weber & Pickering, 
2011). The militarized border also stimulates acts of resistance that are the ‘weapons of the 
weak’ (Scott, 1985) in border wars, but in the process it also generates intensified risks and 
harms – what has been termed ‘border iatrogenesis’ (Weber & Pickering 2011, pp. 200-201). 
Sub-saharan migrants undertake hazardous voyages in inflatable toy boats across the Straits of 
Gibralter to skirt radar detection (Wilson 2015), while others are compelled to traverse ever 
more treacherous routes in an effort to reach the global North. 
 
Additionally, the militarized border, far from extinguishing cross-border threats, animates their 
mutation, adaptation and continual reinvention. FRONTEX joint operation HERA II planned 
to close off the migratory route from Africa to Europe through the Canary Islands, but in the 
process drastically inflated the price of passage and motivated the professionalization of 
smuggling activities (Vives 2009). Similarly, Harding observes that ‘little by little, the routes 
asylum seekers once took to safety have been choked off. The formidable growth in 
underground ‘travel agencies’ – document forgers, chaperones, drivers, boatmen – is the result’ 
(2012, p. 16). However the emergence of new forms of deviant enterprise, rather than leading 
to strategic policy change, energizes processes of security amplification wherein freshly 
materializing security risks and threats form the validation for intensified militarisation and 
augmented funding. Moreover, despite their brutality in terms of the escalating body count and 
their counter-productivity in terms of coproducing transnational deviance, militarized border 
strategies do little to reduce the numbers of those with irregular status inside the global North, 
many of whom initially entered on valid travel documents and have already established lives 
within the barricades. However, they too are increasingly excluded and marginalized, as the 
circuits of migration control have infused the inlands of the global North.  
 
The Migration Policing Web 
Jurisdictions across the global North have witnessed a significant intensification of internal 
immigration policing over the past three decades. A significant element of this has been the 
progressive criminalization of irregular migrants through the emergence of what has been 
termed ‘crimmigration’ law – the gradual merging of immigration law with the criminal law 
(Stumpf 2006). Outlined by numerous scholars (Stumpf 2006, Zedner 2010; Aliverti 2012), the 
development of ‘crimmigration’ law is evidenced by a proliferation of immigration offenses, the 
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progressive criminalization and exclusion of non-citizens and the mobilization of criminal 
sanctions for breaches of immigration law. For example, while 70 immigration offenses were 
passed in the UK from 1905 to 1996, 84 new immigration offenses were created from 1997 to 
2010 in six Acts passed by the UK Government (Zedner 2013). The trend towards the 
proliferation of immigration offences and its infusion with the criminal law is mirrored across 
jurisdictions in the European Union, US, Canada and Australia.  
Twinned with the development of ‘crimmigration’ law has been an escalation in ‘crimmigration’ 
policing and a more generalised intensification of internal migration controls within nation-
states. In Europe the intensification of internal migration controls has been noted by scholars, 
particularly subsequent to the Schengen Agreement and the diminishment of external borders 
at national boundaries. In Germany every public agency must report information about 
irregular migrants to the foreigners’ office, which is required to commence an expulsion 
process (Cyrus and Vogel 2006). In 2001 the Netherlands changed its Aliens Law, 
subsequently allowing police to stop and detain persons to examine their residence status, 
which have they have been able to check since the 1990s on a national database, provided there 
a ‘reasonable presumption’ that they had irregular status (Leerkes, Varsanyi and 
Engbersen2012). This is also evident in the US, where the devolution of immigration policing 
to state and local governments represents a reconfigured ‘immigration geopolitics’ that is 
reinforced via the twinning of two policies – the criminalization of immigration law and 
extended pressure by the Federal Government upon local and state police to enforce civil 
immigration violations (Varsanyi 2008; Coleman 2007; 2009; Stumpf 2006). Recently Weber 
(2013) has charted a similar trajectory in Australia, examining cooperation between state police 
and immigration agents.  
As Coleman (2012) notes in the US case, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act outlined how non-federal agencies could directly police immigration 
offences. The law authorised state and local police to supplement Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service activities during a mass immigration emergency, and more broadly for 
the wholesale delegation of federal immigration powers to non-federal agencies through a new 
addition to the Immigration and Nationality Act – Section 287(g). While initially there was 
limited take up of this legislative provision it accelerated post 9/11, with approximately 70 non-
federal law enforcement authorities enrolled in 287(g) in two dozen US states. This section is 
enforced through both ‘jail-based models’ where local police scrutinize arrestees for 
immigration status, and “roving” models where immigration documents are requested in the 
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course of routine police patrols, and, importantly, not in relation to any specific criminal 
charge. Such measures have been supplemented by an offshoot program of 287(g) called 
Secure Communities which facilitates immigration checks at the local level while not mandate 
that those detained be turned over to federal custody at the end of the process. 
The particular configuration such in-country immigration policing assumes is variable across 
nation-states. In the United Kingdom, operating under a variety of monikers, specific 
‘Enforcement Teams’ dealing exclusively with the detection of immigration offenders perform 
a similar task, although often in cooperation with specific police forces. The intensity of 
immigration policing enforcement is also variable across the United States, with the most 
intensive activity evident in the Southern and South Western States (Coleman 2012). At the 
spearhead of this, as revealed in the research of Provine and Sanchez (2011) is the state of 
Arizona, which has enacted its own state legislation (SB 1070) to enhance police stop and 
search powers. Moreover, the wealth of recent research into the intensification of internal 
immigration policing reveals how such practices are deeply racialized. US research indeed 
reveals how such tactics particularly target those identified as ‘Mexican’ – reflecting a longer 
historical conflation of the category ‘Mexican’ with that of illegal (De Genova 2005).  
While there has been an intensification of direct policing activity enacted through various 
policing agencies, there has also been an evident movement towards deputizing a wide range of 
agencies into the work of immigration policing. This is largely predicated on a drive to exclude 
‘illegal’ migrants from access to public and social services, and is conjoined with a political and 
media discourse that projects images of undocumented migrants as leeching social services and 
economies. This is a trend evident across the global North. Studies in numerous jurisdictions 
indicate that immigration policing is enacted through assemblages of agencies. This is 
particularly the case in the UK where a variety of agencies are involved in immigration policing 
partnerships that aim to identify, immobilize and eject those designated as irregular. As van der 
Luen (2003) charts in the Netherlands, the Linking Act, passed in 1998, rendered access to a 
range of public and semi-public provisions including social benefits, health care, housing and 
education, conditional upon residency status. Despite the Act’s intensely exclusionary potential, 
van der Luen’s study noted that in different agencies there were ‘tendencies of severe exclusion 
as well as tendencies to soften the impacts of the law’  and that the official policy objective of 
systematic exclusion of irregular immigrants was ‘mitigated by professional, humanitarian and 
ethical standards’ (2003, p. 152). Importantly this suggests that attempts to responsibilize other 
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agencies into the work of exclusion and expulsion may be softened by organizational cultures 
that do not share the values of populist politicians or security professionals.  
Nevertheless, there is a powerful drive to draw a range of government agencies into the work of 
migration control, a phenomenon illustrated in recent efforts in the United Kingdom to detect 
‘illegal’ workers. New measures to address illegal working were introduced in February 2008, 
which included a civil penalty regime for those employing workers illegally, along with a new 
offence of knowingly employing an illegal worker. Since that time, workplace enforcement has 
been underpinned by the language of ‘partnership’. One example of such ‘partnership’ working 
was The Joint Workplace Enforcement Pilot (JWEP), conducted in the West Midlands, and 
connecting UKBA officers with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Department of 
Work and Pensions, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, the Health and Safety Executive 
and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform’s Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate. The 
Enforcing the Deal strategy claimed that this resulted in shared intelligence regarding 245 
employers and 372 visits to business premises (UKBA 2008, p. 7). The emphasis upon 
workplace enforcement is buttressed by harsh civil penalties regime, introduced in 2008, which 
imposes fines of up to £10 000 per undocumented worker for businesses, accompanied by a 
‘name and shame’ campaign which published details of offending employers on the UKBA 
website.  
As the example of workplace immigration enforcement in the United Kingdom evidences, an 
ever greater range of agencies is being deputized into the work of immigration policing, which 
envisages migration control as a fine mesh linking agencies together in a common purpose. 
Thus a range of institutions including the National Health Service, local governments, 
universities and schools have been drawn in through a range of legal and administrative 
mechanisms to participate in immigration policing and report those suspected of irregular 
status. In the United Kingdom attempts to responsibilize other elements of the state with the 
work of immigration policing have extended down to the individual level. In October 2011 
Prime Minister David Cameron called upon the public to ‘shop an illegal immigrant’ through 
an arrangement with the Crimestoppers phone number or via the UKBA website. The 
mobilization of the public was evident in Cameron’s claim that ‘together we will reclaim our 
borders and send illegal immigrants home’ (Webber 2012, p. 161). One movement in this 
direction has been the establishment in the United Kingdom of the National Allegations 
Database, designed to facilitate the systematic counting of allegations from the public and 
following them through to outcome (Home Affairs Committee 2012 HC 603, p. 47). The same 
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efforts at responsibilizing individual citizens into the work of immigration control have been 
evident in Australia, where a ‘Dob-In Service’ was established in 2004 allowing individuals to 
report instances where they suspected ‘illegals’ to be working or just present in Australia. 
Tellingly, the press release from the Australian Immigration Minister at the time promoted this 
hotline by claiming illegal workers ‘take employment opportunities away from Australians’ and 
she urged the public to aid in ‘tracking people down’ (Weber 2013, p. 135).  
Efforts to trace and make irregular migrants legible to the state are closely linked to the 
development of electronic databases. This is connected to the overall intensification of internal 
border controls. Surveillance of key groups is linked to attempts exclude them from key 
government services, discourage their residency within nation-states and ultimately to facilitate 
their expulsion from national territories. Consequently it is perhaps unremarkable that 
biometric identification systems have initially been deployed on asylum seeker populations, 
where they serve as technological signifiers of the securitisation of migration. Biometric 
identification systems involving fingerprinting those seeking asylum have become increasingly 
common and are in use in the UK, Netherlands and Australia (Wilson 2006). Databases 
established in the interests of security, have focused squarely on those with irregular status. In 
Europe the Schengen Information System (II), the Eurodac database and Visa Information 
System are vast systems often including biometric data to regulate migratory flows and identify 
and sort legal from illegal migrants (Broeders 2007; Aas 2011). Security logics have also 
motivated a ceaseless quest for system interoperability and the prising open of databases to ever 
more agencies. Following the Madrid bombings in March 2004 the EU Declaration on 
Combatting Terrorism suggested the European Commission ‘explore the creation of synergies 
between existing and future information systems (SIS II, VIS and Eurodac) in order to exploit 
there added value … in the prevention of and fight against terrorism’ (cited in Baldaccini 2008, 
p. 45).  
To be captured fixes a deviant ‘non-citizen’ identity on those seeking asylum or who have 
irregular status. Consequently some who have entered the EU boundaries mutilate their 
fingerprints with burning hobs, razors, glue or acid to avoid biometric capture and the bleak 
prospect of expulsion (Jones 2014, p. 5).  Nor, despite the fact that these digital profiling 
practices are ‘concealed in the glossy techno-science of algorithmic calculation’ (Amoore 2009, 
p. 49) are such databases immune from the racialised stigmatization so frequently evident in 
physical policing. The digital ascription of risk may be presented as an abstracted and scientific 
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calculation that dispassionately sorts friend from foe and the safe from the dangerous. 
Nevertheless, as Bigo argues, the aura of technological neutrality makes the designation of 
specific identities as ‘high risk’ appear ‘reasonable and not subject to classic racism’ as it relies 
upon ‘an anticipation process in which the computer has no soul and, therefore, does not have 
the human defect of classifying persons according to skin colour’ (2007, p. 30). However 
critical scholarship, particularly that focusing upon biometric technology, indicates that, the 
aura of high-technological abstraction and neutrality not-withstanding, digital databases 
assembled to trace non-citizens are steeped in historic codes of racism, colonialism and 
criminalization (Wilson 2007; Pugliese 2010). The scientific calculation of security threats is 
then informed by more ‘instinctive’ stereotypes garnered from the global North’s historical 
gallery of suspect and mobile populations (for a discussion see Weber & Bowling 2008). 
Consequently the colonial dispossessed and the internally marginalised of the past are digitally 
reconstructed in the present as deviant identities within the body politic to be immobilized and 
expelled. Moreover, such criminalization has in some jurisdictions stretched even further, 
where not being legible to the state through the possession of satisfactory identification 
documents becomes a criminal act in itself (Aas 2013).  
 
The escalation of internal immigration policing represents a ‘shift in the spatiality of power’ 
(Walters 2006) of the border from a Foucauldian notion of ‘disciplinary societies’, whereby 
governance is situated in particular sites and technologies, to a Deleuzian ‘society of control’ 
(1992) where decentralized networks form a multitude of gateways through which immigration 
status becomes a principal category of inclusion or exclusion and through which Goffman 
famous termed ‘spoiled identities’ are constructed. Increasingly, immigration policing occurs 
not in a single act of expulsion or exclusion from or at the physical border, but through a 
multitude of encounters embedded within public and private agencies that are dispersed within 
the nation-states. As Bigo argues (2002) the intensification of these exclusionary circuits is 
propelled through a network of security professionals, the ‘managers of unease’, who are 
instrumental in the expansion of these networks, but who also often elide questions of social 
justice and human rights via a discourse of technical efficiency.  
The contribution of political and media discourse in the mobilization of these exclusionary and 
stigmatizing processes should also be taken into account. Indeed, as Wacquant (2009) suggests, 
the criminalization of immigrants has been: 
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powerfully reinforced and amplified by the media and by politicians of all stripes, eager to surf 
the xenophobic wave that has been sweeping across Europe since the neoliberal turn of the 1980s 
by making an amalgam—sincerely or cynically, directly or indirectly, but with ever more banality—
of immigration, illegality and criminality (2009, p. 98). 
The honing of policing and governmental attention and suspicion on those perceived to carry 
the stigma of illegality forms what Jock Young (1971) famously termed a ‘deviancy 
amplification spiral’, wherein through a combination of exclusion, marginalization and 
criminalization ‘irregular’ migrants are forced further into the social and economic shadowlands 
and simultaneously accumulate heightened visibility in the eyes of enforcement authorities.  
 
Everyday Illegality 
The web of surveillance and policing that engulfs irregular migrants forms as Weber suggests in 
the Australian context, ‘a border drawn around unlawful non-citizens themselves, intended to 
separate them from all that is necessary to sustain a reasonable life’ (2013, p. 143). Increasingly 
then, as already outlined, the border materializes through a dispersed array of technologically-
mediated and physical switch points dispersed within the routines of daily life. This section 
examines how the construction of ‘illegality’ is manifest throughout the interior of nation states 
but more specifically how it is experienced by those who are its targets. The previous section 
outlined how a complex web of agencies, both state and private, are engaged in forms of 
immigration policing that construct migrant identities as deviant. As journalist Jeremy Harding 
noted of US border policing in Arizona: 
the pursuit of aliens is no longer confined to a costly cat and mouse game along the 
frontier. It is a grim paper chase that takes place in traffic queues and metered parking 
zones in Phoenix, the kitchens of fast food restaurants, mechanics workshops and 
building sites miles from the fence (2012: 97).  
The implications of this are that migrant ‘illegality’ and deviance can materialize throughout the 
circuits of daily life. Social centres, schools, food banks, welfare offices and police stations all 
become potential sites where the border can materialize at any moment. Moreover everyday 
actions, such as working, driving, attending schools or seeking health care can rapidly be 
transformed into criminal and illicit actions with dire consequences.  
As numerous studies have indicated, the lived experiences of irregular migrants are not 
uniform, but are rather contingent upon the strength of legitimate migrant social networks 
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patterned upon nationality and ethnicity, additionally mediated by age and gender (Engbersen, 
van San & Leerkes 2006; Bloch 2013; Sigona 2012). Nevertheless, there are commonalities 
evident across areas of work, housing, health care and social interaction that evidence the 
vulnerability and precariousness of irregular status. This is starkly apparent in terms of 
employment. The lack of authorisation to seek employment makes working itself a criminal 
activity, and has been argued to be in effect the state sanctioning exploitative working 
conditions. The testimonies of irregular migrants certainly bear this out. Not infrequently 
employers take advantage of irregular status to impose pay low wages and extract longer 
working hours. As one Kurdish man from Turkey residing in the UK recounted to Bloch: 
It’s a form of slavery. They exploit us. If I was able to work legally I could go and say I work such 
hours and demand such amount. But as they know they we need the work and they know the 
conditions they exploit us (2013, p. 8) 
The employment opportunities of irregular migrants are in general confined to the lowest 
reaches of the labour market. As Khosravi succinctly suggests, in the Swedish case ‘if you lack 
“papers” you are placed at the bottom’ (2010, p. 100). Working in often dirty and dangerous 
occupations, irregular workers are vulnerable not only to exploitation through low wages or in, 
some cases, no wages at all, but also to significant health and safety risks. Burnett and Whyte 
(2010) revealed that irregular workers experienced a disproportionality high level of workplace 
accidents and were frequently exposed to health and safety risks, something against which they 
felt powerless to complain due to their undocumented status. 
 
Workplace raids by immigration authorities, employer sanctions written into law and the 
constant threat of deportation serve to deepen racialised faultlines in the labour market and 
exacerbate the vulnerability of the most marginalised. Webber (2012) has charted the shifting 
sands of labour migration policy, which has progressively witnessed the withdrawal of rights and 
the increasingly bulimic tendency to ingest and expel migrant labour at will. In some senses the 
deepening grid of legislative control and policing tactics that attacks the lower rungs of the 
labour market appears to betoken the deep contradictions of globalized mobility, whereby 
capital circulates unimpeded while labour – particularly that moving from the global South – is 
subject to tightening webs of control. Nevertheless the apparently paradoxical binary between 
mobile capital/immobile labour is in actuality more complex and politically expedient.  
A number of critical scholars indeed argue that capital accumulation is in fact the rationale for 
border control mechanisms that cannot feasibly block all mobility, but which suspend certain 
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flows within grey zones of vulnerability and stigmatization (De Genova 2002; Samers 2003; De 
Giorgio 2010). It is an argument that has some substance. Intensifying border control has 
fuelled an explosion of undocumented immigrants in the global North, while hostile social 
representations persistently portray these social groups as undermining ‘native’ working 
conditions. The British Government provides one example, having persistently reiterated the 
idea that undocumented migrant workers undermine ‘the terms of and working conditions of 
British workers’ (Home Office 2007, p. 2). Thus immigration controls, which themselves 
produce illegality, supply a docile labour force while the vulnerability of the undocumented 
echoes through the lower rungs of the employment hierarchy creating a more generalized sense 
of precariousness. As Anderson notes the interests of capital accumulation, ‘gain from cheap 
migrant workers and from labour being divided as a political force’ (2012, p. 148).  
Exposure to potential exploitation also extends into the housing market, with numerous studies 
indicating that irregular migrants frequently pay above market rents, and often in substandard 
accommodation (Calavita 2005; Sigona & Hughes 2012). With social services generally, 
including health, irregular migrants may be reluctant to seek assistance as the capillaries of 
migration control, and potential detection and deportation, infuse a greater array of public and 
private agencies. Such avoidance of state authorities is evident in Castañeda’s research in 
Germany, where pregnant women with irregular status preferred to conceal their visibility from 
the state, rather than apply for a Duldung (a permit that suspends deportation) which would 
qualify them from prenatal care and delivery (2010, p. 255). The desire to reduce visibility, and 
to render oneself invisible to the state and its border control apparatus, significantly impacts on 
social interactions and the pathways of daily life. Daily mobility may indeed be shaped by 
irregular status, avoiding public parks, checkpoints and other public spaces where irregular 
status may be detected (Coutin 2005). The testimony of those with irregular status suggests daily 
itineraries that are often clouded with the fear and anxiety of detection (Sigona 2012). The 
threat of the detection, or of being reported to authorities, can also attenuate potential social 
bonds, with some choosing to engage in only superficial interactions within the society they 
have entered.  
Limited access to civil, social and political rights and the unrelenting peril of deportation 
creates a ‘grey area of vulnerability’ – constricting the socioeconomic chances of migrant 
workers by positioning them in the most precarious sectors of the economy, and driving them 
into the recesses of the illegal economy (De Giorgio 2010). Studies in the Netherlands indicate 
that the severing of access to social services and the labour market for irregular migrants 
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produced a spike in criminal activity, much of it subsistence crime. Increases in the use of 
forged documents, petty theft, drug dealing and prostitution can thus constitute survival 
techniques within an underground criminal economy where invisibility can be maintained 
(Leerkes, Engbersen & van der Leun 2012; Broeders & Engbersen 2007). This constitutes—to 
extend Marx’s (1981) concept of the ‘ironies of social control’—the ironies of migration control, 
as enforcement measures coproduce the very deviant phenomenon they are supposedly 
combatting. Moreover this process all too easily mutates into a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby 
racialised notions of criminality propounded in media and political discourse feed upon 
putative empirical facts, as ever greater numbers of foreign nationals are herded through prison 
gates.  
 
Detention and Deportation 
Accompanying the intensified surveillance of irregular migrants within nation-states, there has 
also been an explosion of detention of those detected, usually for the purpose of pending 
deportation. Since the 1990s, the detention of asylum seekers and other migrants has escalated 
and is now extensive across Europe (Bloch and Schuster 2005). The acceleration of 
immigration detention has been noted by a number of authors. For example Welch and 
Schuster (2005) suggest that immigration detention has exploded in a post September 11, and 
is based upon the political manipulation of images of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. 
Drawing upon David Garland’s (2001) notion of a criminology of the other, they suggest that 
harsh criminal justice measures aimed at immobilizing those designated as dangerous are 
rationalized amidst a climate of fear in which, as they suggest, ‘fear of crime is almost 
indistinguishable from a fear of strangers’ (2005, p. 348). There is thus an explosion of 
immigration detention both in specific facilities, but also via criminalization in various prison 
estates. Within these, irregular migrants are trapped within ‘non-spaces’ that while within 
national boundaries, are spaces of exception where the rights of citizenship and legal protection 
are suspended. The statelessness and absence of political and legal rights of deportation 
regimes has thus drawn many scholars to the work of Giorgio Agamben (1998), whose concept 
of bare life – an existence stripped of social bonds and political inclusion and belonging (De 
Genova 2010). 
While it is evident that a substantial detention infrastructure, often administered by private 
contractors, has materialized across the global North, our knowledge of the lived experience of 
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immigration detention remains fragmentary. What is clear, nevertheless, is that it is 
predominately couched in the language of administrative rather punitive incarceration. As such, 
some scholars have linked the expansion of immigration detention to broader shifts in penality 
that, while disputed have moved from a goal of rehabilitation towards that of incapacitation as 
the goal of imprisonment (Leerkes & Broeders 2010). Thus, with an evident affinity to 
contemporary prison systems which make little effort to reform socially deviant individuals, 
both prisons and immigration detention are targeted primarily at removing those designated 
dangerous from the body politic and ‘warehousing’ – and in the case of immigration detention 
ultimately expelling them from the boundaries of the nation-state. The detention experience 
itself is mediated by the intersections of race, gender, class and sexuality (Hernández 2008). 
While accounts of the lived experience of detention remain scant, research conducted by 
Bosworth (2013) suggests that immigration detention is experienced as punishment and 
detention centres are frequently equated with prisons by those incarcerated. In her research 
Bosworth suggests that it was the statement ‘I feel like I am in prison’ which reverberated as a 
‘constant refrain’ during her research (2013, p. 155). Moreover, Custody Officers frequently 
compared themselves to prison officers, even if perceiving key differences in their tasks, a point 
revealed in other studies (Hall 2012). 
Immigration Detention in a variety of ‘non-places’ is only one element of proliferating 
deportation regimes (De Genova and Peutz 2010). This carceral complex (in the region of one 
hundred centres in Europe) detains without offence, and forms a matrix of ‘waiting zones’. And 
unlike the modernist prison which sought to discipline, the purpose of immigration detention is 
not primarily disciplinary but simply incapacitation and expulsion. Nevertheless, as already 
mentioned, the lived experience may very much be that of punishment. Moreover, the 
Immigration Detention complex operates parallel to a wider racialization of imprisonment, 
fuelled by the gravitation of policing activity towards those whose immigration status may be 
disputed (often on racial grounds), and where minor legal violations can result in incarceration 
and deportation. As Wacquant (2009) notes, the process of identifying and immobilizing those 
whose phenotype indicates ‘foreignness’ creates a ripple effect whereby the exclusionary 
dragnet targeted at ‘illegal’ migrants echoes outward, extending the vulnerability and anxiety of 
deportability throughout migrant communities. Indeed, there has been an expansion of foreign 
national prisoners in the prison estate, who, even though they may not have been convicted of 
serious offences, nevertheless find themselves liable to deportation at the end of their sentence 
(Bosworth 2011). 
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Governments across the global North have become forcefully determined to ‘tighten up’ 
deportation and repatriation policies, often with the aim of preserving the ‘integrity’ of their 
asylum and immigration systems. In particular, there is a strong desire on the part of particular 
states not to be perceived as a ‘soft touch’ through failing to remove ‘illegal’ migrants (Walters 
2010, p. 87). Accounts from those deported reveal that the experience is often one of 
humiliation, degradation and violence. In Coutin’s (2010) retelling of the experience King—
deported from the US to El Salvador—shackles, lack of water and extremes of heat and cold 
formed a debasing experience with the shackles in particular being vivid markers of illegality 
and criminality. The physical violence and use of excessive force in deportation proceedings 
has come to public attention in through some notorious cases, such as the case of Jimmy 
Mubenga, an Angolan man who had lived twenty years in the United Kingdom and was 
asphyxiated on a British Airways flight in October 2010, with an inquest returning a verdict of 
‘unlawful killing’ against the staff of the private security firm with the government contract to 
carry out deportations (Webber 2012). The documentation of humiliation, degradation, 
violence and death as a result of deportations is alarmingly frequent across Europe (Fekete 
2005).  
Violence and death may also occur post-deportation, as those designated either as ‘failed’ 
asylum seekers, ‘illegals’ or foreign criminals are deported, either directly or through third 
countries (a process known as ‘chain deportation’) to nation-states known for their poor human 
rights standards and for practices of illegal detention and torture (Fekete 2005). The growing 
scholarship that examines the post-deportation experience also reveals generalized experiences 
of stigma, marginalization and isolation for deportees, many of whom have lived for much of 
their lives outside their country of birth. Brotherton and Barrios’s (2009) interviews with 
Dominican deportees from the US, revealed the stigmatisation and criminalization of 
returnees, in this instance fuelled by a media campaign in the local press which equated 
deportation with criminality. Other research in this area also reveals wider circuits of social 
marginalization upon return (Golash-Boza 2014; Coutin 2010). In her fieldwork with deportees 
to Somaliland, Peutz (2010) notes that they were met upon arrival with the suspicion of carrying 
HIV/AIDS or being drug addicts. Moreover lacking clan ties and local connections they were 
unable to take advantage of the potential social capital that their knowledge of English and 
computer skills may have granted them. The post-deportation experience then is for some 
potentially fatal. For others, even the physical and linguistic markers—tattoos, clothing, accent—
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that signal their time in the global North, come to constitute deviant and stigmatised identities 
upon return.  
The criminalization, marginalization and stigmatization of irregular migrants is largely produced 
by the expanding control apparatus – both legal, technological and physical – dedicated to their 
detection and removal. Although their experience cannot be assumed to be homogenous, the 
control efforts themselves often escalate migrant deviance, as those with irregular status are 
forced into the recesses of underground economies, and more often than not their means of 
survival or mere presence is criminalized. The circuits of exclusion visited upon irregular 
migrants are also intensely racialized, drawing colonial patterns of oppression into the post-
colonial present. For irregular migrants also, the ever present potential of having ‘illegality’ 
umasked or assigned, combined with spectacles of enforcement and deportation, fashions 
wider experiences of ‘deportability’ (De Genova 2002), where the anxiety of potential 
deportation curtails and shapes everyday experiences. Harsh enforcement measures also 
function as sovereign performances for nation-states, testifying to their capacity to define and 
police the lines between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and by extension the boundaries of belonging 
and citizenship. This is not to say that irregular migrants are without agency. There are a 
multitude of acts of individual resistance to the dispersed forces of border control, and there 
are numerous examples of collective organization where irregular migrants assert their ‘right to 
have rights’ (Arendt 1951) and access to forms of citizenship (Nyers 2003; 2008). Nevertheless, 
confronted with increasingly punitive legal and policy frameworks, political populism, hostile 
media discourses, xenophobic nationalisms, and dispersed and expanding networks of border 
control—which all converge to both construct and normalize ‘deviant’ migrant identities—such 
struggles remain decidedly asymmetrical.  
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